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e Logic of Truth in Paraconsistent
Internal Realism
Manuel Bremer
Institute of Philosophy, University of Düsseldorf
e paper discusses which modal principles should hold for a truth operator an-
swering to the truth theory of internal realism. It turns out that the logic of truth in
internal realism is isomorphic to the modal system S4.
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1. Epistemic Conceptions of Truth
Versions of internal realism or so-called “anti-realism” claim truth to be not
a non-epistemic concept, which means that it does not suce for the truth
of statement that it (merely) corresponds to the facts (or—more generally
speaking—reality). ese conceptions of truth claim rather that we have to
have also some sort of justication for the statement being true (whether
that is just an ordinary justication or some “canonical” justication in a
corresponding theory of justication).
In some versions of anti-realism this amounts to the proposal that truth
is something like ideal assertability or provability in some comprehensive
(intuitionistic) formal system (cf. Tennant 1987). In some versions of inter-
nal realism truth has a double nature, requiring both correspondence to the
facts and being justied as part of our best theories (cf. Bremer 2008).
We do not have to deal with the details what might be understood as
an appropriate justication, the minimal consensus of theories which take
truth as not non-epistemic—and thus at least as partially epistemic—is that
from some fact obtaining—where again we have not to deal here with the
details of an appropriate ontology or theory of truth makers—one cannot
simply conclude to some corresponding statement being true (the statement
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made by using a corresponding sentence in some situation in an assertoric
utterance).
2. Problems with Convention (T)
Given this further denitional requirement of justication/being justied,
Convention (T)
(T) T⌜p⌝ ≡ p
becomes problematic in its right to le direction. Whereas
(T-LR) T⌜p⌝→ p
is unproblematic since what is true has to be the case
(T-RL) p → T⌜p⌝
is nowno longer acceptable. Even if ⌜p⌝ corresponds to the facts (i.e. obtains)
that does not imply that we have a justication for believing ⌜p⌝.
Note: Any interesting theory of truth will possess enough expressive
power to yield antinomies, at least if the truth operator are added to oth-
erwise standard logics like PC or FOL (cf.omason 1980). Iterations of the
truth operator then contain or simulate the ability to take about the truth of
something being true. Given names for statements some statements speak
about their own truth or non-truth. e logic of truth should thus be a
paraconsistent logic and inconsistent contexts should be considered when
discussing proposals for axioms of the truth operator.
Given that the system to be construed in rich enough to derive anti-
nomies, on all accounts, there is no need to introduce ‘is true’ as a predicate.⌜T⌝ may be introduced as an operator, i.e. not requiring the sentences in its
scope to be quoted.
What then is the logic of truth—taking ⌜T⌝ to be an operator in one’s
paraconsistent theory of truth?
3. Truth as a Normal Modality⌜T⌝ behaves in several ways like a necessity operator ⌜◻⌝.us we obviously
should have
(T1) Tp → p
If truth is not veridical what is? Further on Modus Ponens (deductive clo-
sure) should hold for truth:
(T2) T(p → q)→ (Tp → Tq)
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Given that proofs are the best justication one can have the analogue to Ne-
cessitation: it should hold:
(T3) ⊢α → ⊢Tα
So far the logic for ⌜T⌝ is a normal modal logic of the strength of system T.
Iterations of ⌜T⌝ are (syntactically) allowed and harmless.
4. Iterations of the Truth Operator
ere is no dual operator to ⌜T⌝ like ⌜◇⌝ is to ⌜◻⌝. But one may consider:
(T4*) p →∼T∼p
e operator ⌜∼T∼⌝ need not have an own name or symbol, but so would
behave like ⌜◇⌝.
Even if the theory under consideration is inconsistent (T4)may still hold
for a correspondence conception of truth. Everything then, however, de-
pends on whether the truth operator is taken as a bivalent operator or not.
Let us—for a moment—consider truth tables as means of a realistic (i.e.
not internal realistic) conception of truth. If one wants to say that an in-
consistent statement is true and is not true at the same time, then the truth
operator is not bivalent: ⌜Tp⌝ and ⌜∼Tp⌝ are both accepted (cf. Priest 1979,
2006). If the truth operator is not bivalent, since inconsistent statements and
therefore their negations are both true and not true, we can have at the same
time: p, ∼p, Tp, T∼p, ∼Tp, ∼T∼p.
e truth operator then can be given by the following truth table:
p ∼p Tp ∼Tp T∼p ∼T∼p
1 0 1 0 0 1
0 1 0 1 1 0
0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1
An internal realist cannot accept this truth table, since it validates (T-
RL), which was rejected above. It also validates (T4*).
If the truth operator is bivalent it is used to ascribe the semantic property
of being true (cf. Bremer 2005). A statement can have that property even if
it also has the property of being false or being not true. Saying of a statement
that has this property that it has that property is simply true then, and not
false at the same time. One then has even in case of an inconsistent statement⌜p⌝: p, ∼p, Tp, T∼p, but not: ∼Tp, ∼T∼p.
e truth operator then can be given by the following truth table:
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p ∼p Tp ∼Tp T∼p ∼T∼p
1 0 1 0 0 1
0 1 0 1 1 0
0,1 0,1 1 0 1 0
Again, an internal realist cannot accept this truth table, since it also val-
idates (T-RL).
Nevertheless, if one takes ⌜T⌝ to be a bivalent operator—as it is in consis-
tent contexts anyway, and as one should rather do—then (T4*) can turn out
false, namely in case that ⌜p⌝ is inconsistent. us even in a realistic setting
(T4*) is not acceptable, once one takes ⌜T⌝ to be a bivalent operator.
As a heuristic the internal realist should at least reject all those supposed
principles of truth that are rejected by a realist who takes truth to be a bi-
valent operator. Having a justication or having a statement being forced
upon us by our best theories is something that is given or not, and not given
and not-given at the same time, i.e. being justied is a bivalent property. It
may happen that one has a justication for some statement ⌜p⌝ and its nega-
tion ⌜∼p⌝, but this does not amount to having a justication for ⌜p⌝ and not
having it. Rather one has two justication for contradictory statements.
If (T4*), however, is rejected and (T1) is accepted, then either Double
Negation Elimination or Contraposition has to be rejected, since by these
two principles (T4*) can be derived from (T1). Inasmuch as paraconsistent
logics stick to a standard conception of negation—and thus to Double Nega-
tion Elimination—Contraposition has to be given up. Contraposition as a
principle of inference is not valid in Priest’s logic LP (cf. Priest 1979), and
should not be valid even in a realistic paraconsistent conception of truth (cf.
Priest 2006, 70–71, 79–80; Bremer 2005, 185–190).
An axiom expressing seriality in normal modal logics may claim:
(T5*) Tp → ∼T∼p
is again can hold for realists if the theory is inconsistent and the truth
operator is not bivalent, otherwise it fails: In case of antinomies we have a
justication for ⌜p⌝ and we have a justication for ⌜∼p⌝, and we may accept
that both contradictory facts obtain, thus invalidating (T5*).
Similar reasoning applies to the analogue to Brouwer’s Axiom
(T6*) p → T∼T∼p
Any antinomy ⌜p⌝ makes the antecedent true but not the consequent if the
truth operator is taken as bivalent. In consistent contexts (T6*) may, of
course, be accepted—but we are looking for general principles of truth.
So far then the logic of a bivalent truth operator corresponds just to
modal system T (with the truth operator having no dual).
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More dicult is the assessment of
(T7) Tp → TTp
which corresponds to the modal S4 axiom. If some statement is true is it
then also true that it is true? (T7) is an instance of the otherwise rejected (T-
RL). Even if (T-RL) is not valid for simple (rst level) truths, could it hold
for second or higher level truths?
Remember that although
p → ◻p
does not hold in S4 we nevertheless have
◻p → ◻ ◻p
Accepting (T7) depends on whether in case that we have that Tp obtains
we also have a justication that it obtains. is need not be so, it seems.
Some statement may be true without our recognizing this. Internal realism
makes truth epistemic, but that does not mean that we recognize all truths.
Something can be true (i.e. there is a justication that is feasible and available
for us) without us having hit on its justication. On the other hand if there
is some justication in principle available to us that ⌜p⌝ is true, then there
should also be a further justication in principle available to us which states
that because ⌜p⌝ is true (i.e. we have already justied that p and so have that
Tp obtains) we also have to assume as justied that ⌜Tp⌝ is true, i.e. ⌜TTp⌝.
Iterating on our verdict thatwe not only believe p to obtain, but have justied⌜p⌝ should be harmless.us (T7) should hold.
Remember that Brouwer’s Axiom does not follow from the S4 axiom,
thus one can have the S4 axiom without Brouwer’s Axiom.
Given that Brouwer’s Axiom does follow from the S5 axiom an internally
realistic conception of the truth operator should not accept
(T8*) ∼T∼p → T∼T∼p
or respectively (substituting ⌜∼p⌝ for ⌜p⌝ and applying double negation elim-
ination):
(T8*) ∼Tp → T∼Tp
And one need not accept (T8*) as internal realist. If ⌜∼p⌝ or ⌜p⌝ is not true
that can be either because the corresponding fact does not obtain or because
the required justication is missing (not available in principle). at the re-
quired justication ismissing need not be available in principle to us, wemay
just be and stay unsure whether we come forward with such a justication.
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e situation is dierent from the situation with respect to (T7), since the
presence of a justication is something quite dierent from its absence.is
dierence resembles the dierence between a sentence being provable and
a sentence being not provable. If a sentence is provable a Turing machine
setting forth all proofs will sooner or later hit upon it, and then aer a -
nite time one knows the sentence to be provable. If, however, the sentence
is not provable no amount of not coming about its proof does ascertain that
it has no proof. Non-justiability resembles non-provability. And so (T8*)
demands too much. No internal realist should accept it.
(In epistemic modal logics (T8*) claims negative introspection for the
knowledge operator. And although this may hold for closed technical sys-
tems like data bases it certainly does not hold for human knowledge.)
erefore the analogue to the S5 axiom should be rejected. e logic of
the truth operator has to be weaker than S5.
Where exactly between S4 and S5 has the logic of truth to reside?ere
are several logics (and characterising axioms) between S4 and S5. e rst
one is S4.1, the characteristic axiom of which◻((◻(p → ◻p)→ p)→ (◇◻p → p))
translates into
(T9?) T(T(p → Tp)→ p)→ (∼T∼Tp → p)
It is hard tomake sense out of this in terms of truth. If it is true that the truth
of obtaining p bringing forth the truth of ⌜p⌝ has p obtaining, then it being
not true that ⌜p⌝ is not true gives us p. In a realistic understanding of the
truth operator, even if the truth operator is taken as bivalent, (T9?) comes
out valid, even for antinomic ⌜p⌝. So the negative heuristics used above does
not apply here. On the other hand does the consequent of (T9?) look far too
strong for any statement. If we consider the justication aspect of truth in
internal realism, then the absence of a justication for not having a justi-
cation of something does not yield this something. For the consequent to be
false (only) ⌜p⌝ has to be false (only). By the correspondence aspect of truth
then ∼Tp is the case. From this, however, we do not get ⌜T∼Tp⌝ since we need
not have a justication of ⌜∼Tp⌝ being principally available to us.e status
of the consequent remains then unresolved for the internal realist.e sup-
posed truth of the antecedent may be of little help in this case. One might
argue that in case of ⌜p⌝ being false (only) and given our knowledge of the
irrelevant cases of the material conditional we should have ⌜T(p → Tp)⌝.
So ⌜T(p → Tp) → p⌝ would be false (only), and thus the whole antecedent
would be false.is then would allow for (T9?) itself to be true. (T9?) might
be vacuously valid, since its antecedent is always false (only) for internalis-
tic truth. But none of these reections provide the principle (T9?) with an
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acceptable reading/interpretation in terms of internalistic truth. So (T9?)
should not be taken as valid for the truth operator.
And at this level our search for further axiomsmight then stop.ere is,
however, a bifurcation in extending S4: one can have S4.1 or one may move
to S4.2, the latter not containing S4.1, although both extend S4 and both are
contained in S4.3.1 (cf. Hughes andCresswell 1968, 261–264).e alternative
next stage then would be S4.2, the characteristic axiom of which◇◻p → ◻◇p
translates into
(T10*) ∼T∼Tp → T∼T∼p
If it is not true that ⌜p⌝ is not true, then it is true that ⌜∼p⌝ is not true. e
acceptance of (T10) seems to depend on some principle of exhaustion like
tertium non datur. Can we come to grips with (T10)? If it is not true that p
is not true, then ⌜p⌝may be true, it seems; thus being consistent one may be
led to conclude that it is true that ⌜∼p⌝ is not true. Now, even in a realistic
understanding of truth: if ⌜p⌝ is inconsistent and the truth operator is biva-
lent, then ⌜Tp⌝ is true, thus ⌜∼Tp⌝ false (only), thus ⌜T∼Tp⌝ false (only), thus
the antecedent is true, while the consequent is false, since ⌜T∼p⌝ is true, thus⌜∼T∼p⌝ false (only), thus ⌜T∼T∼p⌝ false (only). us, given our heuristics,
the internal realist should also reject (T10*). e logic of the truth operator
certainly has to be weaker than S4.2. Given the obscurity of (T9?) it should
be weaker than S4.1 as well.
e logic of the truth operator in internal realism, therefore, is S4.
5. A Semantics for Semantics
Of course truth is as central to semantics as reference ormeaning. And an un-
derstanding of truth was presupposed all along. Nevertheless onemay ask—
in the manner of ordinary modal semantics—what semantics goes with the
truth operator.
As a rst answer to that we can now outline the accessibility restrictions
that come with the outlined behaviour of the truth operator. Accessibility is
reexive and transitive.
As a second answer one may interpret accessibility here as preserving
what is xed according to our best theories and the facts while allowing mat-
ters we have no justied opinion on to uctuate in truth value. Since truth
in internal realism possesses the double nature of a correspondence and a
justication aspect not just justiability has to be preserved. e accessi-
ble worlds are possible as far as we know. Accessibility here resembles—as
to be expected for internal realism or versions of anti-realism—accessibility
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in epistemic modal logics (cf. Meyer and van der Hoek 1995). Any world
should be compatible with what the best theories in that world say, thus
should be accessible to itself: reexivity. And inasmuch as truth is closed
under consequence and a justication for ⌜p⌝ is a justication for ⌜Tp⌝ ac-
cessibility should be transitive.
As is well known, for standard logics like PC the modal extension to S4
is deductive complete and correct with respect to the reexive and transi-
tive frames. In a paraconsistent setting one may take a logic like LP as the
extensional base logic and extend it with (T1), (T2), (T3) and (T7). If one
provides a modal semantics for this system, then the truth operator has to
have a necessity-like truth condition (analogue to knowledge in epistemic
modal logics). e non-triviality of LP is preserved and the reasoning be-
hind the standard correctness proof still applies here.
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